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Abstract 
This article outlines the recommendations of the UK Pensions Commission, and 
the data and analysis on which they were based, including projections of 
demographic change, trends in private pension saving, and evolution of the state 
pension system. The Commission concluded that without reform, structural 
problems with UK pensions would lead to increasingly inadequate and 
inequitable provision in 15-20 years time. It recommended reforms which 
would lead to a more generous, more universal and less means-tested state 
system than would otherwise evolve, and the establishment of a low cost 
National Pension Savings Scheme, into which employees without good 
employer provision would automatically be enrolled. The proposals, which have 
now largely been adopted by the UK government, imply eventual increases both 
in state spending on pensions as a share of national income and in State Pension 
Age, but accompanied by measures to facilitate later and more flexible 
retirement. 
 
JEL number: H55 
Key words: Demographic change; Pensions; Retirement incomes; Social 
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Introduction 
The second report of the Pensions Commission (PC, 2005), of which the author 
was a member, was published two days before the sixty-third anniversary of the 
publication of Beveridge’s great 1942 report, Social Insurance and Allied 
Services. The day after publication of that report, queues famously formed 
around HMSO’s offices to get copies. There were no such queues the day after 
our report was published, although there had been more than half a million 
website hits on downloadable versions of its chapters on the day of publication. 
 
This paper summarises the evidence and arguments behind the Commission’s 
recommendations. A fundamental part of that evidence is the degree to which, 
in common with other European countries, the UK is an ageing society, with 
part of this driven not just by rising longevity, but also by rapidly increasing 
expectations of further longevity improvements in the future. 
 
Demographic change 
Figure 1 shows successive Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) principal 
projections of female (cohort) life expectancy at the age of 65. In the 2001-
based projections, available to the Commission when we started work in early 
2003, this was projected to rise slowly from a little over 20 years now to just 
over 21 years for women reaching 65 in 2050. In the most recent, 2004-based 
projections, the latter figure had risen by four years to nearly 26 years. For men 
reaching 65 in 2050, projected life expectancy is now 23.6 years, compared to 
only 19 years in the 2001-based projections. This view of the world for which 
we are planning pensions policy changed profoundly just while the Commission 
was sitting. 
 
But, as such revisions illustrate, such projections are inherently highly 
uncertain. It is instructive to look at the projections Beveridge himself was 
using in his 1942 report, summarised in Table 1. These suggested that just thirty 
years ahead, the proportion of the population aged over State Pension Age (60 
for women and 65 for men) would have risen from 12 per cent in 1941 to 21 per 
cent by 1971. In fact, it was only 16 per cent in 1971 and will not – on current 
projections – reach 21 per cent above what will be the unified SPA of 65 until 
2026, before heading rapidly up to 23 per cent in 2031 and 25 per cent in 2050. 
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Figure 1: Women’s cohort life expectancy at 65: Government Actuary’s 
Department principal projections 
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Source: PC (2005), figure 1.38 (derived from GAD, 2005 and earlier equivalents). 
 
 
Table 1: 1942 and 2005 projections of age structure 
 Beveridge Report 
projections, 1942 (GB) 
Actual 
(GB) 
GAD principal 
projections, 2005 (UK) 
  1941 1971 1971 2004 2031 
Under 15 (%) 20.6 16.5 23.9 18.2 16.1 
15-SPA (%) 67.5 62.6 59.7 63.3 61.0 
SPA and over 
(%) 
12.0 20.6 16.4 18.5 22.9 
Old age support 
ratio 
5.6 3.0 3.6 3.3* 2.6* 
 
*Using population over 16. 
Sources: Beveridge (1942); Government Actuary’s Department (2005) and earlier equivalent for 1971 
actual population. 
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Beveridge and the Government Actuary who advised him did not foresee the 
post-War baby boom. As well as increasing life expectancy, the second factor 
driving the increase in the proportion of the population over 65 is the unwinding 
of the impact of the baby boom. As Figure 2 illustrates, what we now expect to 
see over the next 25 years is a rapid catch-up to where the old age dependency 
ratio would have been without the baby boom (the dashed line), if fertility rates 
had remained at their level of the 1930s, rather than rising above them until the 
mid-1970s as they actually did (the solid line). Over the next twenty years we 
will get back to where Beveridge might have thought we would have got to, 
having had a period of what has been in some ways false security. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of the 1940s-1960s baby boom on the old age dependency 
ratio 
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Source: PC (2005), figure Ex.1. Population aged over 65 as proportion of those aged 18-64 (England). 
 
As well as the need to prepare for increasing longevity, a second implication of 
this is therefore to expect the unexpected, Future demographic structure is 
highly uncertain. Further life expectancy of 23.6 years for men reaching 65 in 
2050 may indeed be the most reasonable projection we can make now, but some 
would still defend the logic of an effective “limit to life” which produced the 
projection of 19 years a few years ago.  On the other hand, others would point 
out that even the new higher projection implies quite a rapid slow-down in the 
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rate of improvement of age-specific mortality which we have experienced for 
the last 25 years. If that trend in fact continued, male life expectancy at 65 could 
reach 29 years by 2050. Similarly, the Continuous Mortality Investigation of the 
actuarial profession has recently both increased its projections of life 
expectancy for current 65 year-olds, but also the range of uncertainty to 3.5 
years around even this relatively short-term projection.1 
 
We thus have to work with best projections, but recognising that they could be 
wrong. In setting policy it needs to become robust to such uncertainty – which 
is why as a Commission we would rather policy emerged around principles, 
such as that “state pension ages should gradually adjust to keep a fixed 
proportion of adult life in retirement” than to set definitive ages decades ahead 
that are not adapted as we move forwards into what is now a wide funnel of 
doubt. 
 
Pensions in an ageing society 
But the best estimates are that longevity is increasing and that the proportion of 
the population over a given age is increasing. In the Commission’s first report 
(PC, 2004) we said that this left us – and indeed any nation in this position – 
with four choices: 
¾ Pensioners becoming poorer relative to the rest of the population; 
¾ Later retirement; 
¾ A greater amount of tax and/or National Insurance Contributions as a 
share of national income devoted to state pensions; or 
¾ Greater savings for retirement. 
 
We argued that we found the first option unattractive. So did those giving 
evidence to us, and those surveyed in research for the Commission (PC, 2005, 
appendices B and D). When a national deliberative polling session was held by 
the Department for Work and Pensions around the Commission’s proposals in 
March 2006, at the end of the day’s discussions only 12 per cent of the more 
than one thousand participants thought that relatively poorer pensioners would 
have to be part of the solution to the UK’s pensions problems. By contrast, more 
than half thought that people would have to work longer, and 80 per cent or 
more that more taxes would have to be spent on pensions and that people would 
have to save more for their retirement (PC, 2006, figure 1). When asked how 
big a role the option of poorer pensioners should play in solving future pensions 
                                           
1  For more detailed discussion, see PC (2005), Appendix E, based on a lecture given by 
Adair Turner at the CASS Business School in April 2005. 
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problems, participants awarded an average of 0.3 points out of ten to it, as 
opposed to around three points for each of the other options. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, pensioner poverty (in relative terms) rose sharply in the 
1980s, but since then it has fallen, and one of the present Government’s major 
achievements has been to continue this reduction. Pensioner poverty in 2004-05 
at 19 per cent (before housing costs) is 8 percentage points lower than it would 
have been without the tax and benefit changes since 1997 (Sutherland, 2004). 
 
Figure 3: Pensioners in poverty, 1979 to 2004-05 (percentage with incomes 
below 60 per cent of population median income adjusted for family size) 
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Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2006a). 
 
As a Commission we took it as read that any reforms should be based on 
protecting the gains this government has made towards the aim spelt out by the 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown, at the 2002 Labour Party Conference of “ending 
pensioner poverty in our country”. We therefore assumed that the minimum 
income for pensioners set by what is now called the “Guarantee Credit” should 
not lose value relative to contemporary living standards.2 Future public 
                                           
2  This principle has now been affirmed as part of government policy in the White Paper 
responding to the Commission’s proposals (DWP, 2006b). 
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spending could, of course, be lower if this assumption was relaxed, but only at 
the cost of increasing pensioner poverty. 
 
Recent trends in provision for retirement 
Our second report therefore spelt out the mixes of the other three options which 
we thought desirable and achievable. But we did so against a background in 
which as a nation we are currently reducing rather than increasing provision for 
future retirement incomes. Inflows into funded pension saving remained at 
around 3.7 per cent of GDP between 1992 and 2002. More recently they have 
increased, reaching 4.3 per cent of GDP in 2004 (PC, 2005, figure 1.14). 
However, of this about 0.7 per cent of GDP represents “catch-up” payments to 
protect the already promised rights of existing members of private sector 
“defined benefit” (DB) pension schemes, such as those related to final salaries. 
The underlying long run flow into funded pension saving is falling – eventually 
to perhaps just over 3 per cent of GDP (PC, 2005, figure 1.15), allowing for the 
way in which new employees (and even some existing employees) are being 
promised “defined contribution” (DC) pensions which are in fact much less 
generous than given in the past. In the private sector, membership of pension 
schemes is falling. In 2002-03, 10 million private sector employees contributed 
to non-state pensions, but 10.5 million did not. By 2004-05, contributors had 
fallen to under 9 million and non-contributors had risen to over 11.5 million 
(PC, 2006, figure 2). 
 
At the same time, as discussed in more detail below, the state system has been 
set to evolve in a way which would mean much lower pensions in relation to 
earnings for typical earners than being enjoyed now by some of those recently 
retired and near retirement, who have got the best out of what was the State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS, now the state second pension).  
 
Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows that effective ages of retirement have fallen 
considerably over the long term, although there has been a welcome recent 
reversal – with average effective retirement ages increased by a year in the ten 
years from 1995 to 2005. The long-run effect, combined with the increasing 
longevity discussed above, has been a rapid rise in the percentage of adult life 
spent in retirement from a quarter in the 1950s to a third for those retiring today 
(PC, 2005, figure 1.44).  
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Figure 4: Trends in mean age at retirement 
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Source: PC (2005), figure 8.3. 
 
But people are not aware that this is happening. Our own surveys confirmed 
recent Nottingham University research3 that younger cohorts simply do not 
anticipate the increase in their life expectancy that actuaries now predict. There 
is little difference between the life expectancy implied by people’s anticipated 
retirement date and expected length of retirement between those in their 
twenties and those in their fifties (Table 2): people judge things by what 
happened to their grandparents and parents, not by actuarial projections. And 
recent qualitative research by the Institute for Public Policy Research suggested 
that some people simply do not believe the projections of increasing life 
expectancy when put in front of them. The combination of projections of 
increased future needs, but public lack of knowledge about their scale, makes 
policy-making very hard. 
 
                                           
3  O’Brien, Fenn and Diacon (2005). 
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Table 2: Perceptions and projections of life expectancy 
 Men Women 
Current 
age 
Omnibus 
survey 2005 
perceptions 
GAD 2004- 
based 
projections 
Gap Omnibus 
survey 2005 
perceptions 
GAD 2004- 
based 
projections 
Gap 
16-25 81.1 88.5 -7.4 80.7 91.0 -10.3 
26-35 81.4 87.6 -6.2 81.4 90.1 -8.7 
36-45 82.2 86.7 -4.5 82.6 89.2 -6.6 
46-55 81.9 85.9 -4.0 81.3 88.4 -7.1 
56-65 81.7 85.1 -3.4 83.6 87.7 -4.1 
 
Source: PC (2005), appendix D, figure D.36.  Omnibus survey results based on sum of individual 
expectations of retirement age and length of retirement. GAD projections based on assumption of 
survival to 65 on basis that answers for expected length of retirement would be given assuming 
survival to retirement age. 
 
The current outlook 
Putting all of these trends together, looking 15-20 years ahead, in the absence of 
change, some retirees will be as well off in relative terms as their equivalents 
today – including private sector employees who remained as members of 
generous defined benefit schemes as they closed to new members, and those 
with good careers in the public sector. If the minimum income for pensioners 
continues to be linked to average earnings, the same relative protection would 
apply to many of the poorest pensioners as well. 
 
But there are other groups that already have poor pension provision, such as 
those with interrupted paid work careers, including many women, and those 
with low to median earnings working for small and medium-sized 
organisations. Beyond these, many others, expecting to be as well-off as their 
equivalent predecessors, are in for a nasty surprise – either not knowing what is 
coming or hoping “it will be all right on the night” and that “they won’t let you 
starve will they?”, as Peter Taylor-Gooby (2005) summed up views found in his 
recent research. Indeed, if we did do nothing now and “muddled through”, it is 
highly likely that political pressure would force an ad hoc increase in state 
pensions. But such a muddle-through option is unlikely to be either fair or 
economically optimal by comparison with what we could achieve if we plan 
ahead now. 
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State pensions 
Recent governments have hoped that the private sector will take more of the 
strain, keeping public spending in check by linking the basic state pension 
(BSP) to prices rather than earnings. At the same time, the present government 
has reformed the state second pension (S2P) and introduced the means-tested 
Pension Credit to help low earners and protect the poorest pensioners. 
 
It is instructive to see how the state system would change if the indexation 
arrangements being followed at present were continued. Figure 5 shows the 
pension that someone retiring in 2005 would receive at that point from the state 
if they had spent a full paid work career at different earnings levels and had 
made no private pension saving. Figure 6 shows the same for someone retiring 
in 2050 under this assumed evolution of the system, all in today’s earnings 
terms. What the figures show is that in effect we would move from a partly 
earnings-related state pension system to a complex flat-rate system. Indeed, 
carried to its logical conclusion the system would become somewhat more 
generous to low-earning non-savers, but it would be much less generous to 
those with around average earnings with some private pension. For instance, 
someone with median earnings or above paying the equivalent of 10 per cent or 
more of earnings above the income tax threshold into a private pension would 
receive only the basic and second pensions from the state (PC, 2005, figure 
4.10). These would together be worth around 25 per cent of median earnings, 
compared to the 35-50 per cent of median earnings their equivalents would 
receive today. 
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Figure 5: State pension income at retirement, retiring in 2005, assuming no 
private saving (% of median earnings) 
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Source: PC (2005), figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 6: State pension income at retirement, retiring in 2050, assuming no 
private saving (% of median earnings), current indexation continued 
indefinitely 
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Source: PC (2005), figure 4.7. 
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Despite those reductions in its generosity for individuals in particular 
circumstances, if the state system continued to evolve in this way, its cost would 
rise as a share of GDP. Figure 7 shows the Commission’s projection, based on 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) model, Pensim 2. Care should, 
of course, be used in interpreting any such projections, based on just one set of a 
multiplicity of assumptions about future demography, labour markets, and 
savings behaviour. However, they give a useful base for examining the 
implications of changes to policy. Spending on state pensions and other cash 
benefits for those over state pension age would rise in this base case from 6.2 
per cent of GDP now to 7.6 per cent of GDP in 2050. This increase – also 
shown in the government’s own most recent projections (HM Treasury, 2005, 
table 5.1) – is hardly surprising given the projection that there will be 6 million 
more people over 65 by 2050. 
 
Figure 7: Public spending on pensioner benefits as % of GDP (if current 
indexation arrangements continued indefinitely) 
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Source: PC (2005, figure 1.19) based on results from DWP’s Pensim 2 model. 
 
As the figure shows, within the rising total a roughly constant proportion of 
national income would be spent on the national insurance-based basic and 
second state pensions together, but means-tested top-ups would increase, the 
cost of Pension Credit quadrupling from 0.5 to 2 per cent of GDP. This reflects 
the way in which, as other state and private sources of pension income fell, an 
increasing proportion of pensioners would become entitled to means-tested 
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assistance through the Pension Credit. With the base case assumptions used in 
Figure 7, the proportion of all single or couple pensioners subject to means-
testing through Pension Credit would rise steadily from about 40 per cent now 
to 75 per cent by 2050 (PC, 2005, figure 6.5). Note that in this world, even if we 
did away with the new part of Pension Credit, the Savings Credit, 40 per cent of 
pensioners would – unless they increased saving in the face of this wider 
prospective means-testing – end up needing the Guarantee Credit (what used to 
be called Income Support or National Assistance) just to get their incomes up to 
the State’s minimum, unless that minimum itself was reduced, at the cost of 
increased pensioner poverty. This compares with just under 25 per cent in this 
position today.  
 
The complexity of this potential system, and the widespread belief that potential 
means-testing might mean a low return on pension saving, are both barriers to 
private saving increasing in the way governments have hoped for. 
 
But there are inherent barriers too. For those with low- to middle-incomes 
saving individually outside large occupational schemes, costs are high. Annual 
Management Charges (AMCs) for “stakeholder pensions” sold to individuals 
are now capped at 1.5 per cent of accumulated savings for the first ten years, 
and then to 1 per cent. This gives an average cost even for someone contributing 
for a long period and with relatively high earnings of around 1.3 per cent per 
annum, a sizeable slice of a long run real return that might reasonably be 
expected to be between 3-4 per cent. At such charges – despite being much 
lower than charged on personal pensions in the past – people’s pension pots are 
likely to end up 20-25 per cent smaller than if they had the 0.2-0.3 per cent costs 
enjoyed by large occupational schemes. This does not necessarily reflect 
excessive profit-making by the insurance companies which sell such pensions: 
selling and running individual pensions involve large lump sum costs per policy 
which absorb a high proportion of small savings (PC, 2005, figure 1.25). 
Indeed, at the stakeholder capped level of costs, trying to sell pensions to those 
with below median earnings is not an attractive commercial proposition for the 
providers. 
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Objectives of pension policy 
So even if the state system was simpler, less means-tested and more stable we 
do not believe that voluntary pension provision will revive by itself. Does that 
mean we should compel people to save a certain amount, e.g. to achieve the at 
least two-thirds replacement of earnings most4 say they want?  
 
But people are wary about this. The focus groups conducted for the 
Commission suggested that people both wanted to “have to save”, but not to be 
“compelled” (PC, 2005, appendix D1). And if you do compel people, how much 
should you do so, given their widely varying situations, views of adequate 
income, housing assets and perhaps future inheritances? 
 
This was the challenge facing the Commission. It was easy to have sympathy 
with one of Beveridge’s conclusions: 
“The problem of the nature and extent of the provision to be made 
for old age is the most important, and in some ways the most 
difficult, of all the problems of social security” (1942, para. 233).  
And as a Commission we took one of his principles as read: 
“Any Plan of Social Security worthy of its name must ensure that 
every citizen … can claim as of right when he is past work an 
income adequate to maintain him … a pension on retirement from 
work which is enough for subsistence, even though the pensioner 
has no other resources” (1942, para. 239). 
But crucially we agreed with a second of his fundamental principles: 
“… social security must be achieved by cooperation between the 
State and the individual … The State in organising security should 
not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a 
national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for 
voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that 
minimum for himself and his family” (1942, para. 9).  
 
In fact we go further than this partnership between individual and state. The 
lecture on which this paper is based was delivered on the fiftieth anniversary of 
Richard Titmuss’s famous lecture on “the social division of welfare”, which 
drew attention to the importance of “occupational welfare” (Titmuss, 2001). 
The role of employers in pension provision is still crucial today – but is very 
                                           
4  PC (2005), appendix D, figures D.28 and D.29. 
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varied and in retreat, even though making employer pension contributions is a 
highly tax-efficient way of paying people. Our approach echoes not just 
Beveridge, but also Lloyd George’s famous “9 pence for 4 pence” offer from 
the combined role of individual, employer and state. 
 
But where we part company with Beveridge is on the role of the state. 
Beveridge’s view was of a non-redistributive system – flat rate contributions 
(the “stamp”) for flat rate benefits. As people such as Howard Glennerster and 
Martin Evans (1994) have pointed out, this was the undoing of the original 
Beveridge scheme. There were never enough resources to get people above the 
subsistence minimum if National Insurance was funded by a kind of poll tax. 
And provision beyond the minimum was patchy and unequal in terms of what 
replacement rates people could achieve. 
 
There are varied views on this. At one end, some have argued that the State’s 
role should or can only be that of poverty relief. At the other, people argue that 
it is the state which should organise and provide earnings-replacement for all or 
nearly all, as indeed has been the case in many continental European countries. 
 
But if the State’s role stops at poverty relief, many will end up discovering 
themselves under-provided for or will pay very high costs to get what they 
want. On the other hand, we tried earnings-replacement when the State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS, now transmuted into the state second 
pension) was introduced in 1978, but we never really accepted the cost. We paid 
for it by reducing the cost of the flat-rate BSP through the price-linking of the 
last twenty-five years (Hills, 2004). The low-paid, women, and the self-
employed were the losers. The most recent reforms – and the move to the 
complex flat rate system described above – can be seen as ways of trying to 
wind back this clock. Taking the longer view, in three generations we would 
have returned to something not so far from the flat rate system based around the 
basic state pension established following the Beveridge report, but achieved in a 
much more complicated way. 
 
At their heart, the Commission’s conclusions accept the arguments put to us that 
the state should concentrate its redistributive power on providing a minimum 
platform on which people can build. But its role does not stop there. We argue 
that the state should: 
¾ Ensure that all people are kept out of poverty in retirement; 
¾ Encourage people to achieve at least a base-load of earnings-related 
pension provision; and 
¾ Enable all people to save for a pension at low cost.  
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To achieve this we propose three linked directions for reform: 
¾ Establishing a low cost National Pension Saving Scheme (NPSS), with 
employees automatically enrolled into either this or good quality existing 
employer schemes. Individuals would have the right to opt out, but also to 
make additional contributions beyond the automatic minimum. 
¾ Underpinning this with a state pension reform which would deliver more 
generous, more universal, less means-tested and ultimately simpler state 
pensions. Over the long-term this would require both some increase in the 
percentage of GDP devoted to state pensions and an increase in the State 
Pension Age (SPA). 
¾ As a corollary of a rising SPA, the state should facilitate later and more 
flexible retirement, and make sure that implementation of reform is 
sensitive to differences in life expectancy by socio-economic group. 
 
State system reforms 
It is simplest to start with proposals for the state system, as this sets the 
framework for what extra would be needed to achieve any given target 
retirement income from the NPSS or existing occupational schemes. There are 
many different ways of achieving the kind of flat-rate platform we describe. But 
if, first, a system is to achieve an adequate platform on which people can build 
without means-testing spreading still further, and second, to have at its heart the 
ability of women to have an independent income in retirement (a very different 
assumption from that made by Beveridge), demography implies that in the long-
run both the SPA and public spending will have to rise. How much each does so 
is a trade off. The lower and upper limits of the “proposed range for debate” in 
Figure 8 below show the range of public spending needed to deliver a pension 
on an independent basis which would match the amount currently given by the 
Guarantee Credit for a single pensioner (plus the cost of extra items such as 
disability and housing benefits). 
 
In the short-term there are of course gaps in provision, but many people are 
currently reaching retirement with good rights from SERPS/state second 
pension and private defined benefit pensions. Indeed, the generation recently 
retired or now nearing retirement has, taken as a whole, better pension rights 
than their predecessors enjoyed or their successors are likely to enjoy. To 
achieve structural reform, the case for higher public spending than now comes 
after 2020. However, as Figure 7 shows, the already planned increase in 
women’s SPA to 65 between 2010 and 2020 would on current assumptions lead 
to a fall in spending as a share of GDP. This could be seen as creating some 
latitude for changes that would begin to build long-term reforms within roughly 
constant spending as a share of GDP up to 2020. 
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In dealing with increasing longevity, there is a strong argument that equity 
between generations implies that the SPA should rise in proportion to life 
expectancy in some way. Indeed, if we were only dealing with increased 
longevity, this could allow fixed spending as a share of GDP. But we are not – 
we are now facing the impact of the fertility declines after the baby boom 
(Figure 2). Putting all of the cost of this on the near-retirement generation by 
increasing SPA far faster than life expectancy would seem unfair. This leaves 
the range shown in Figure 8. 
 
The least aggressive approach would be to say that once SPAs for men and 
women are equalised at 65 in 2020, the proportions of adult life spent in 
retirement should be kept constant. At that point the Government Actuary’s 
Department’s most recent principal projections would imply average life 
expectancy at 65 for men and women together of 22 years. Noting that that is 
half of adult life since 21, one could, for instance, establish a “two for one” rule 
– two years after 21 before SPA for every expected year after it. That kind of 
rule might take the SPA to 67 by 2050 under current projections – but with the 
implication that spending would need to reach around 8 per cent of GDP 
compared to 6.2 per cent today. 
 
At the other end, it is hard to imagine a reform being politically acceptable in 
which the expected length of life after pension age actually shrank from where 
it is now. That would put a limit – again on current projections – of about 69 by 
2050, which would allow required public spending to be somewhat lower, at 
around 7½ per cent of GDP.  
 
This is the kind of structural trade-off that faces us. Note that while this is the 
uncomfortable message that both pension ages and spending on pensioner 
benefits as a share of national income need to rise after 2020, in both cases the 
rise is gradual. The range means for instance that today’s 50 year-olds, men and 
women, would still have an SPA of 65 as already expected, but today’s 40 year-
olds could expect something around one year higher, at 66.5 
 
There are several different ways one could design a more flat-rate, less means-
tested state pension that achieves Beveridge’s “room and encouragement for 
voluntary action” for individuals to provide more than the minimum. Our 
second report discusses in detail the pros and cons of some alternatives, but in 
the space available it is only possible to sketch out the option which after 
detailed analysis we believe offers the best way through the competing criteria. 
We suggest that, faced with the huge complexity of where we start from, it is 
                                           
5  The Government’s White Paper proposals are in the upper half of this range, with 
SPA proposed to rise to 66 between 2024 and 2026 and to 68 by 2046. 
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actually simpler to evolve from where we are, than to face what turn out to be 
huge transitional complexities of a “big bang” introduction of a new system. 
What we propose as our preferred way forward has five elements: 
¾ Building on recent reforms to the state system, accelerating the evolution 
of the State Second Pension to become flat-rate, but with improved 
credits for those caring for children or for elderly or disabled people. 
¾ Indexing the Basic State Pension to average earnings growth rather than 
prices over the long term so that it stops losing relative value, and moving 
accruals of rights to it onto a universal, residence-based basis (as opposed 
to the current contributory basis). 
¾ Maintaining the progress in reducing pensioner poverty achieved by the 
introduction of Pension Credit, but limit the spread of means-testing by 
freezing the real value of the maximum Savings Credit (the part paid to 
pensioners with income just above Guarantee Credit level). 
¾ Gradually increase State Pension Age after 2020 in line with increasing 
life expectancy to reach between 67 and 69 by 2050. 
¾ Ideally make payments of the basic state pension on a universal basis to 
all individuals mid-way through retirement, say aged over 75 (to cope 
with the way in which older generations of women in particular were able 
only to build up partial rights to it). 
  
If all the elements of that except the last (which has short-term, rather than long-
term costs) were implemented, the costs (subject to the usual health warnings 
about such projections) are shown in Figure 8 by comparison with both current 
spending and those that would arise from the way the system is currently 
evolving (as in Figure 7). The solid line shows their trajectory if the rise in SPA 
after 2020 reached 68 by 2050 for today’s 23-year-olds, and the dots showing 
where it would reach on rules implying more or less rapid change in the SPA. 
Such an increase in spending would, of course, be painful for tomorrow’s 
taxpayers, but it would be to a level below that which many other countries 
have already reached, even before their less favourable demography kicks in.  
 
Such a reform would in combination with our other proposals allow, instead of 
an increase in the numbers affected by means-testing through Pension Credit, a 
decrease, both in the proportion of pensioners affected at all from today’s levels 
of 40 per cent to around one third, and in the numbers requiring to claim 
Guarantee Credit to make their income up to the State’s minimum from 25 per 
cent today to around 15 per cent (PC, 2005, figure 6.42).  
 
It also means that instead of a reduction in the replacement rate from non-
means-tested pensions the state would be offering a typical earner in mid-
retirement from its current level, it would be slightly higher (PC, 2005, figures 
6.4 and 6.19). Low-paid workers and those with interrupted paid work careers 
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would be better off than their equivalents today, particularly if they had even a 
small level of savings.6 
 
Figure 8: The public spending – state pension age trade-off 
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Source: PC (2005, figure Ex. 5). 
 
Encouraging savings and the National Pension Savings Scheme 
Crucially, reforms of this kind to the state system would mean that people were 
not losing the benefit of their pension saving through reduced Pension Credit, as 
they would if means-testing spread in the way that it would if current indexation 
arrangements were to continue indefinitely. This gives the underpinning needed 
                                           
6  The Government’s White Paper proposals are largely to accept this package with two 
main modifications. First, indexation of the Basic State Pension to earnings is planned 
to start in 2012 (if resources allow), rather than the 2010 proposed by the 
Commission, so that its long-term value will be slightly lower. Second, instead of 
residence-based accrual of rights to the BSP and universal payment of it at 75, a series 
of changes to contribution conditions from April 2010, notably a reduction of the 
number of qualifying years to receive a full BSP to 30, are intended greatly to 
increase the proportion of women entitled to a full BSP. 
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for the second leg of the Commission’s proposals – the message that, except for 
those in very unusual circumstances, saving for retirement is a good deal, and so 
enrolment in the National Pensions Saving Scheme is an offer you would not 
want to refuse. 
 
It also sets the challenge for how much might be needed. As we set out in our 
second report, the wide variations in people’s circumstances and preferences 
means that we are a little cautious in the aims we set for the state to use the 
power of inertia in strongly encouraging people to build up a base-load of 
earnings-replacement retirement income through a system of automatic 
enrolment into the NPSS. For instance, if 45 per cent were set as the minimum 
base-load replacement rate to be aimed at for a median earner, the state system 
we suggest as outlined above would get two-thirds of the way there. Another 15 
per cent would be needed from private saving on top. To get that, someone 
starting saving at 30 would need contributions equal to about 6 per cent of total 
gross pay.7 We therefore suggest the following structure of default contributions 
into the NPSS, into which everyone would be automatically enrolled, unless 
their employer was automatically enrolling them into a good quality 
occupational scheme:8 
¾ Minimum default contributions set at about 8 per cent of earnings 
between the income tax threshold (currently just under £5,000) and an 
upper limit (equivalent, say, to the current upper earnings limit for 
National Insurance Contributions). 
¾ Half of this, 4 per cent, would come from the employee’s net pay. 
¾ 1 per cent would come (for a basic rate taxpayer) from tax relief. 
¾ There would be a compulsory minimum employer contribution of 3 per 
cent. 
 
Depending on participation rates, this last element would have an aggregate cost 
(after tax and National Insurance Contribution relief) of about 0.6 per cent of 
labour costs. It would allow the message that for the default contributions there 
would be a pound for pound match of the employee’s net contributions from net 
pay. It would also help to ensure that the danger of people ending up with low 
rates of return on their own savings as a result of means-testing was minimised, 
which would be crucial to allowing the introduction of automatic enrolment into 
                                           
7  For sensitivity of this estimate, see PC (2005), figure 6.29. The figures in the text 
assume a real rate of return on assets of 3.5 per cent, retirement age of 67, and annual 
management charges for the NPSS of 0.3 per cent of accumulated assets.  
8  Again, the Government’s White Paper proposals follow the recommended structure, 
although the start date is proposed to be 2012, and the Government is still consulting 
on how the NPSS or an equivalent system of “personal accounts” should be run. 
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the NPSS (or any equivalent system) without the need for expensive individual 
advice about participation.9 
 
But we could also use the NPSS as a way of enabling people to save more at 
low cost through extra voluntary contributions to it – we suggest up to twice the 
default amount for a median earner. This would allow them to get close to the 
two-thirds replacement rate people around median earnings tend to set as their 
objective. Put together, the state reforms and the NPSS proposals would build 
up in the way shown in Figure 9. For someone who spent the bulk of their 
working age life in the UK either in paid work or in caring activities the basic 
and second state pensions together would deliver at the point of retirement at 
the State Pension Age around 30 per cent of median earnings. Depending on the 
proportion of this time that they remained in the automatic enrolment part of the 
system, a median earner would receive a further 15-18 per cent of median 
earnings from the automatic enrolment part of the NPSS, with the option to 
double this. 
 
Figure 9: Pension income as percentage of earnings for median earner at 
point of retirement 
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Source: PC (2005, figure Ex. 7). 
 
The funds in the NPSS would be invested at each individual’s discretion – but 
generally in bulk-bought funds of different kinds at the low management costs 
this kind of system would allow. People would be building up their own asset – 
                                           
9  For more detailed discussion of the issues around the compulsory employer matching 
contribution, see PC (2006), section 4. 
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potential funds worth up to £161,000 (relative to contemporary incomes) for 
someone on median earnings saving at double the default rate.  
 
The lead times involved for the scheme to reach maturity are of course long, but 
on reasonable assumptions by 2050 it would be producing the 0.6 per cent of 
GDP needed to offset the likely fall in private pension savings we foresee (PC, 
2005, figure 6.39). The outflow from it as income to pensioners could, 
depending on the rate of additional contributions and participation reach 
between 0.6-1.0 per cent of GDP in 2050, rising quickly to between 0.8 and 1.3 
per cent of GDP by 2060 (PC, 2005, appendix F, figure F42).  
 
Distributional impact 
Put together, we think this is a progressive package involving the painful 
realities of later retirement, higher revenues needed for state provision in the 
long run, and greater private saving, but offering a better deal to women, carers 
and the low-paid than is now on offer. Key elements in achieving this include: 
¾ The NPSS would open up low-cost pension saving to those previously 
excluded from it because their contributions would be too low. 
¾ The very lowest income pensioners (those who currently fail to claim the 
Guarantee Credit) would gain from more automatic rights to earnings-
linked state pensions 
¾ State pension spending would increasingly be concentrated on individual 
rights to a flat-rate minimum: 
- The indexation of the basic state pension to earnings would halt 
decline in its relative value 
- Future accruals to rights to the basic pension would be on a 
universal (residence before retirement) basis 
- Credits for carers towards the state second pension would be 
improved 
¾ As a result there would be reduced reliance on benefits based on a family 
means-test, rather than the increase in reliance which would occur under 
existing arrangements. 
¾ The desirable addition of payment of the basic pension on a residency 
basis to all individuals aged over 75 (building on existing ‘Category D’ 
pensions). 
 
But to set alongside this, there is a further key issue. The trends in life 
expectancy discussed at the start of the paper are of course averages. As Sir 
Michael Marmot (2003) discussed in his RSS Beveridge Lecture, there are 
shamefully large differences in life expectancy by social class. Earlier figures, 
such as in Figure 1, show cohort life expectancies, allowing for anticipated 
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future improvements in age-specific mortality. By contrast the recent trends in 
life expectancies by social class shown in Figure 10 are for period life 
expectancies at 65 – how long people would live in a “Groundhog Day” world 
with their future lives trapped, for instance, in the late 1990s. They therefore 
understate how long we would expect each cohort actually to live as they move 
through real time. But the differences between social classes are a reasonable 
guide – five years between the least and most favoured social groups of men 
still. And while all social groups have gained, the gaps show no sign of 
narrowing. As a corollary the proportionate – but not absolute – impact of an 
increase in State Pension Age on, for instance, manual workers would be greater 
than that on professional workers. While this should not be a reason to avoid the 
inevitability of state pension ages rising with life expectancy to create the 
sustainable system that is in the interests of all who will depend on it, it means it 
is essential that any reform taken as a whole has to be progressive in its impact.  
 
It also means that as a corollary of pension reform, it has to be a very high 
priority to address the causes of such inequalities – laid out, for instance, in 
Michael Marmot’s lecture – crucially doing so earlier in people’s working lives. 
It is, after all, those currently aged 40 or under who would be affected by our 
proposals for a gradual increase in SPA. But long-run pension reforms also need 
to be accompanied by an agenda that facilitates later working and gradual, 
rather than sudden, moves into retirement. We discuss these in more detail in 
Chapter 8 of our second report, but potential elements include: 
¾ Allowing earlier claim of Guarantee Credit for those with low incomes 
than the gradually increasing SPA (for instance, the age for claiming 
Guarantee Credit could remain stay at 65 after 2020 as the SPA rose). 
¾ Examining an option for lower pension age for the basic pension and a 
higher for the state second pension. 
¾ Remove the default retirement age of 65 from anti-age discrimination 
legislation 
¾ Widening public knowledge of advantages of deferring claiming state 
pensions (the amount paid now rises in perpetuity by 10 per cent for each 
year of deferral) and allowing people to claim part of their state pension 
but defer the rest as in Sweden, for instance to support continued part-
time work. 
¾ Giving incentives to employers to hire workers above SPA, for instance 
through reduced employer National Insurance Contributions. 
 
Conclusion 
Our report does not talk about an immediate crisis in pensioner incomes. There 
are gaps and inequities, of course, which many would want to rectify if they 
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could find the resources to do so. But it is looking 15 to 20 years ahead that we 
see major structural deficiencies and inequities. That interval should not be an 
excuse for deferring decisions. The Green Paper exploring equalisation of men 
and women’s pension ages was published in 1991. The changes it led to start in 
2010. The last widow benefiting from the pensions given for veterans of the US 
civil war in the nineteenth century died only recently. Pension reforms have 
long lead times and take a long time to work their way through. What we have 
now is an opportunity to build a consensus on the way forward, not a reason for 
inaction. 
 
There may have been queues round the Stationery Office when Beveridge’s 
report was published on 2 December 1942. But the queues were probably longer 
for the film Casablanca, released a week earlier. Those who have seen it will 
remember the moment when Humphrey Bogart explains to Ingrid Bergman why 
she has to get on the plane with the dull but important Victor Lazlo, rather than 
staying with him. 
 
We are in the same position on pension reform. As Bogart might have put it, if 
we miss the opportunity we have now to construct a way forward, we’ll regret 
it. Maybe not today. Maybe not tomorrow. But soon, and for the rest of our 
(hopefully lengthening) lives. 
 
 
 24 
References 
Beveridge, Sir W. (1942) Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd. 6404. 
London: HMSO. 
Department for Work and Pensions [DWP] (2006a) Households Below Average 
Income: An analysis of the income distribution 1994/5 – 2004/5. Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services. 
DWP (2006b) Security and Retirement: Towards a new pensions system, 
Cm.6841. London: TSO. 
Government Actuary’s Department (2005) 2004-based Principal Population 
Projection, UK. London: GAD. 
Glennerster, H. and Evans, M. (1994) ‘Beveridge and his assumptive worlds: 
The incompatibilities of a flawed design’, in Beveridge and Social 
Security: An international retrospective (eds. J. Hills, J. Ditch and H. 
Glennerster). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hills, J. (2004) ‘Heading for retirement? National Insurance, state pensions, and 
the future of the contributory principle in the UK’, Journal of Social 
Policy, 33: 347-72. 
HM Treasury (2005) Long-term public finance report: An analysis of fiscal 
sustainability, Pre-Budget Report document. London: HM Treasury. 
Marmot, M. (2003) ‘Social inequalities in health’, RSS Beveridge Lecture, 7 
May 2003 (mimeo). 
O’Brien, C., Fenn, P. and Diacon, S. (2005) How Long do People Expect to 
Live? Results and implications. Nottingham: Centre for Risk and 
Insurance Studies, University of Nottingham. 
Office for National Statistics [ONS] (2005) Trends in life expectancy by social 
class 1972-2001, ONS Longitudinal Study, England and Wales. London: 
ONS. 
Pensions Commission (PC) (2004) Pensions: Challenges and choices, first 
report of the Pensions Commission. London: TSO. 
Pensions Commission (PC) (2005) A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-
first Century, second report of the Pensions Commission. London: TSO. 
Pensions Commission (PC) (2006) Implementing an Integrated Package of 
Pension Reforms, final report of the Pensions Commission. London: 
TSO. 
 25 
Sutherland, H. (2004) Poverty in Britain: The impact of government policy 
since 1997. An update to 2004-5 using microsimulation. Cambridge: 
Microsimulation Unit, Cambridge University. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005) ‘Uncertainty, trust and pensions: The case of the UK 
reforms’, Social Policy and Administration, 39(3): 217-32. 
Titmuss, R. (2001) ‘The social division of welfare: Some reflections on the 
search for equity’, in Welfare and Wellbeing: Richard Titmuss’s 
contribution to social policy (eds. P. Alcock, H. Glennerster, A. Oakley 
and A. Sinfield). Bristol: Policy Press. (Lecture in honour of Eleanor 
Rathbone originally delivered in 1955). 
 
